George:

I am intrigued by Wesley Clark's candidacy. With no real track record on issues, we can only evaluate him on personality -- which is also something of an unknown at this point. There has already been reporting of Clark's handling of the Pristina airport affair, which is an incident that raises some questions. They are questions that can be answered, but they need to be.

The Pristina airport affair, for those who are not familiar with it, was an incident in June, 1999, during the Kosovo operation at a time when control of the Pristina airport could have made a great deal of difference in who controlled the way that the Kosovo operation ended. The American government was trying very hard to keep the Russians out of Kosovo, because the Russians had historically sided with the Serbians, who were killing ethnic Albanians in the Pristina area at the time. The American government feared that a Russian presence at Pristina would make our operations to protect Kosovo much more difficult.

On June 12, 1999, the Russians sent in a force to occupy the airport, a move that was viewed with great concern by the State Department and the Defense Department. Wesley Clark, being the NATO commander in Kosovo, had to try to decide how to respond; he had instructions that covered a wide range of topics, but not the Russians dropping down into the middle of Kosovo without prior consent. He ordered that 500 paratroopers get ready to drop in on Pristina to occupy the airport. The British General who commanded the troops in question refused, saying "General, I'm not going to start World War III for you." Clark then backed off, there was no big confrontation, and ultimately diplomacy got the Russians back out of Pristina -- not, apparently, before the Serbs killed more Albanians under the cover of their Russian allies. It seems likely that the Russian excursion to Pristina was an operation by a rogue commander wanting to help out his Serbian friends rather than a plan hatched in Moscow; diplomacy through Moscow got the troops pulled back out.

This incident has been rather prominently discussed by conservative columnists anxious to trash Clark quickly, but I'd like to hear General Clark on the matter. In particular, I'd like to know:

1. What advice or directives had he gotten from his superiors on dealing with this sort of problem? If his orders were to keep Russian troops out at all costs, then his order is just a matter of following his own orders. If he was just told, "We really don't want the Russians here -- try to discourage them," then there are military management issues, as well as concern about how Clark reacts to situations where the orders just aren't clear.

2. How insistent was he that the 500 troops air-drop in there? There are stories about Clinton, in the privacy of the White House, complaining to aides about bombs that ought to be dropped, or other angry threats; his inner circle knew to disregard such outbursts. In one story that I recall about Richard Nixon, he was ranting to Henry Kissinger and one of Kissinger's interns about some foreign leader who needed to have a bomb dropped on his head. Kissinger said something back to Nixon about how he'd get right on it. The horrified intern turned to Kissinger as they left the Oval Office, and said, "You're not really going to do that, are you?" Kissinger laughed and said, "No. You've got to be able to tell when he means it. If he calls me back in an hour and asks about whether the plane has left the ground yet, I'll know it's something that I have to worry about." In other words, is the Pristina airport incident just a colorful anecdote about anger, or is it truly the sign of someone who was trigger-ready to commit American troops into a dangerous situation, provoking a possible major war? My suspicion is that it is just a colorful anecdote about anger rather than a sign that he is anxious to start World War III.

3. Who is going to be the aide or adviser who says, "No, Mr. President?"

Lloyd Snook (electronic mail, September 23, 2003)